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Loyalty Oaths
Within the past two years loyalty-oath programs from Arizona, New
York, and Maryland1 all marched their last mile to the Supreme Court;
as expected, none returned. Last January a fourth program, also from
New York,2 endured a similar journey and lived to tell the tale; the
reasons for its survival are far from apparent. In the first three decisions
the Court, following earlier dispositions, articulated no single over-
riding objection that would invalidate all loyalty-oath programs, con-
tinuing instead to talk as though somewhere the perfect, the constitu-
tionally invulnerable loyalty-oath program might exist. In the fourth
case the Justices, in a summary affirmance, hinted that they had found
what they were looking for. The result is a renewed confusion about
what the Supreme Court's attitude toward oath systems really is, and a
further proliferation of the doctrinal complexities that the Justices have
been weaving around the loyalty-oath programs.
The essence of loyalty-oath programs is their self-executing character.
The applicant for, or recipient of, some governmental benefit-most
commonly public employment-confronts the option of pledging his
fealty or foregoing the benefit. The details of operation may vary, but
the attraction of loyalty-oath programs is their automatic operation:
failure to take the oath entails, directly or indirectly, loss of position.
When the piecemeal objections the Court has employed to invalidate
loyalty oaths are unraveled and examined, however, the conclusion
emerges that while a state can still, if it wants, attempt to administer
oaths, it cannot achieve the self-executing feature that makes an oath
program the cheapest, most easily administered and most insidious form
of security program.
1. Elfbrandt v. Russell, 584 U.S. 11 (1966); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 US.
589 (1967); Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54 (1967).
2. Knight v. Board of Regents, 36 US.L.W. 3296 (US. Jan. 22, 1968), aff'g mem. 269 F.
Supp. 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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I.
Over the past century the Supreme Court has accumulated a raft
of doctrinal devices to invalidate loyalty-oath programs. One set of
arguments flirts with the blanket proposition that all loyalty oaths are
unconstitutional; but the Court has never gone further than to hint at
their existence. Another set deals only with flaws in particular oath
systems; such tactics have allowed the Court to avoid wholesale over-
turnings of state and federal law, but at the cost of obfuscating whatever
underlying constitutional objections there may be to loyalty-oath pro.
grams.
A. Direct Attacks on Loyalty Oaths
The Justices have suggested two rationales capable of invalidating all
loyalty oaths. The first, based on the bill of attainder clauses, appeared
in the Court's initial confrontation with the issue, re-emerged in the
middle 1940's, and enjoyed a major revitalization in June, 1965. The
second, derived from the "speech-action" analysis of the first amend-
ment urged on the Court by two Justices for the last two decades, has
never commanded the support of a majority.
1. Bill of Attainder
Cummings v. Missouri (1866)3 involved the criminal prosecution of
a Catholic priest who refused to execute the loyalty oath required by
the 1865 Missouri Constitution. The oath required lawyers, doctors,
ministers, and other professionals to deny by affidavit that they had
ever, "by act or word," manifested a "desire for [the] triumph" of the
nation's enemies or a "sympathy" with the rebels. 4 False swearing
constituted perjury; serving without the oath was a criminal offense.
A sharply divided Supreme Court struck down the provision as a bill
of attainder,5 which was defined by Justice Field for the majority as any
legislative act inflicting punishment without judicial trial. Punishment,
in turn, meant "[t]he deprivation of any rights, civil or political, pre-
viously enjoyed .... the circumstances attending and the causes of the
deprivation determining this fact."" The challenged law satisfied the
test: it reached words as well as action, and the acts it sought to purge
3. 71 'U.s. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866).
4. Id. at 279.
5. Cummings was decided before the enactment of the fourteenth amendment, go that
the Court had no recourse to either first amendment or due process arguments.
6. Id. at 320.
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bore no possible relation to fitness for the enumerated professions.7
The Supreme Court next relied on the bill of attainder provision
some 80 years later, in United States v. Lovett (1946).8 There the House
Appropriations Committee had found three government employees
guilty of "subversive activity," and Congress in the Urgent Deficiency
Appropriation Act prohibited salary payments to them. The Court
read the law as more than a mere fund cut-off remitting petitioners to
a legal action for services rendered. Instead, the history of the statute
revealed it to be a discharge and bar to re-employment based on a leg-
islative judgment of the undesirability of petitioners' political beliefs.
Cummings and its companion case, Ex parte Garland, demonstrated that
"legislative acts, no matter what their form, that apply to named indi-
viduals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as
to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial," were uncon-
stitutional. 9 Here, said Mr. Justice Black for the majority, the direct
naming plus the perpetual exclusion from government employment
amounted to a bill of attainder.
However, resurrection of the attainder theory was shortlived. In
American Communications Association v. Douds (1950),"0 the Court
found that Lovett and its predecessors did not reach Section 9(h) of the
National Labor Relations Act. That law required each officer of any
union invoking the services of the Labor Board to file an affidavit
swearing
that he is not a member of the Communist Party or affiliated with
such party, and that he does not believe in, and is not a member of
or supports any organization that believes in or teaches the over-
throw of the United States Government by force or by any illegal
or unconstitutional methods."'
The Court saw no difficulty in distinguishing Section 9(h) from the
7. Id. at 318. A companion case, Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866), chal-
lenged a federal statute requiring lawyers to swear that they had never voluntarily borne
arms against the United States, held office in authority hostile to the United States, or
"given ...aid, countenance, counsel, or encouragement" to the rebels. Petitioner had
been a member of the confederate Arkansas Senate, but had received a full pardon from
the President. The law fell on the same grounds as had the Missouri provision: for those
who could not take the oath, the statute "operate[d] as a legislative decree of perpetual
exclusion," and such an exclusion "from any of the professions or an), of the ordinary
avocations of life for past conduct [could] be regarded in no other light than as punish-
ment for such conduct." Id. at 377. Justice Field conceded a congressional power to regu-
late qualifications for public office, but, again, not as "a means for the infliction of punish-
ment." Id. at 380.
8. 328 US. 303 (1946).
9. Id. at 315.
10. 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
11. Id. at 386.
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laws earlier held invalid: "in the previous decisions the individuals
involved were in fact being punished for past actions; whereas in this
case they are subject to possible loss of position only because there is
substantial ground for the congressional judgment that their beliefs and
loyalties will be transformed into future conduct," 12 the fomenting of
political strikes. That Congress had enacted no laws against political
strikes was apparently immaterial.
The emphasis in Douds on the forward-looking operation of Section
9(h) suggested that a union could retain its NLRB affiliation and the
officer his position merely by his resigning membership in the Com-
munist Party.'3 To plug this loophole, the 1959 Landrum-Griffin Act
replaced Section 9(h) with a new Section 504, providing that "no
person who is or has been a member of the Communist Party . . .
shall serve... as an officer... of any labor organization."14 In United
States v. Brown (1965)15 the Supreme Court held the section a bill of
attainder. Douds was nominally distinguished by its past-and-future-
conduct reasoning, but actually eviscerated. In an argument as appli-
cable to the old Section 9(h) as to its successor, Chief Justice Warren
found Section 504 infected with "the evil the Framers had sought to
bar: legislative punishment, of any form or severity, of specifically
designated persons or groups."1 The old statute may have entailed only
a "loss of position," the Court said, but the new one, by its retroactive
application, inflicted punishment. "It would be archaic to limit the
definition of 'punishment' to 'retribution.' Punishment serves several
purposes: retributive, rehabilitative, deterrent-and preventive."17
Moreover, by designating mere membership in the Communist Party
as the proscribed status, rather than some activity as forbidden con-
duct, Congress had drawn an impermissible inference that "all mem-
bers share [the] ... evil purposes [of some] or participate in their illegal
conduct"; at the same time, the legislature had "specif[ied] the people
upon whom the sanction it prescribes is to be levied," thereby usurping
the courts' adjudicative function.'3 As Mr. Justice White noted in dis-
sent, the majority condemned the statute for both overinclusiveness
in its indiscriminate lumping together of all Party members, and for
12. Id. at 413.
13. Id. at 414.
14. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.O. § 504 (1964)
(emphasis added).
15. 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
16. Id. at 447.
17. Id. at 458.
18. Id. at 456, 461.
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underinclusiveness in its omission of non-communist potential political
strikers.' 9
2. "Speech" vs. "Action"
A second objection applicable to all loyalty oaths emerged during the
1950's from the dissenting opinions of Mr. Justice Douglas; it stood
effectively as an application of the more general "absolutist" position
formulated in first amendment cases by Justices Douglas and Black fol-
lowing the collapse of "dear and present danger" in the Dennis de-
cision.20 According to Justice Douglas in the loyalty-oath cases, the first
amendment protected all belief, expression, and political association; the
state could impose sanctions only for illegal conduct. Loyalty-oath pro-
grams sought to inflict punishment for beliefs or associations rather than
conduct. In Adler v. Board of Education (1952),21 Douglas dissented
from the Court's upholding of the New York Feinberg Law. For him,
the statutory procedure, under which a finding of membership in
"subversive organizations" established a prima fade case for dis-
qualification for public employment, rested on a principle of guilt by
association.22 The effect of such a procedure on the teachers to whom
the Feinberg Law applied would be to inhibit the pursuit of truth,
"which the First Amendment was designed to protect."2= Justice
Minton, speaking for the Court, was unimpressed: "From time im-
memorial, one's reputation has been determined in part by the com-
pany he keeps."24 In reply, Justice Douglas protested that "the guilt of
the teacher should turn on overt acts. So long as she is a law-abiding
citizen, so long as her performance within the public school system
meets professional standards, her private life, her political philosophy,
19. Id. at 464. On one occasion the Court circumvented the bill of attainder argument by
holding that the government could affix reasonable qualifications to the granting of public
employment. In Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951), Los Angeles had
adopted an ordinance denying public employment to anyone who within the preceding
five years, was, or who thereafter should become, a member of, or affiliated with, any or-
ganization advising, advocating, or teaching the overthrow of the government by unlawfulmeans. The city also required an affidavit from the employee, stating whether he was a
member of the Communist Party. Mr. Justice Clark accepted Lot'lt as precedent, but
found in the case before him reasonable relation oE past conduct "to presnt and future
tust." The attainder argument faled because the Court could find no imposition of pun.
ishment in "a general regulation which merely provides general standards of qualification
and eligibility for employment." Id. at 722.
20. Dennis v. United States, 341 US. 494 (1951); see Reich, Mr. justice lad: and the
Living Constitution, 76 HARv. L. REV. 673, 696-97 (1963).
21. 342 US. 485 (1952).
22. Id. at 508.
23. Id. at 511.
24. Id. at 493.
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her social creed should not be the cause of reprisals against her. 2 6
Justice Minton promptly retreated to the "privilege" doctrine: "If [the
teachers] do not choose to work on such terms," he said, "they are at
liberty to retain their beliefs and associations and go elsewhere. '" 2
The Court has advanced from Adler's studied indifference to first
amendment issues, but it has never brought itself to adopt the
"speech-action" formulation urged on it by Justice Douglas. In-
deed, its occasional efforts to deal with the first amendment issue in
loyalty-oath cases have not been impressive. As early as Cummings,
the Court had recognized that loyalty oaths inflict a punishment for
disfavored belief; the bill of attainder clause was simply made to do
service for a first amendment principle then inapplicable to the states.27
By the 1940's the first amendment applied to state action, but the
Justices were no longer disposed to give it weighty consideration. In
In re Summers (1945),28 where Illinois denied a pacifist admission to
the bar for his refusal to swear that he would serve in the Illinois
militia, the Court concluded that the state had done no more than estab-
lish reasonable qualifications for the practice of law. Justice Black pro.
tested in vain that the state's action punished the petitioner's religious
conviction "through the circuitous method of prescribing an oath, and
then barring an applicant on the ground that his present belief might
later prompt him" to violate his avowals in the highly unlikely event
that he was called on to serve.29 Five years later, the Douds Court was
at least willing to admit the existence of a first amendment issue, but
thought it outweighed in the balance by the national interest in shelter-
ing interstate commerce from the evils of the political strike.30 In Garner
v. Board of Public Works (1951),31 which followed a year later, Justice
Clark dismissed the first amendment objections to the Los Angeles
loyalty-oath program for public employees, as well as bill of attainder
objections, by analogizing the municipality to a private employer and
holding that the latter was as free as the former to consider the political
beliefs of applicants in determining fitness for service. The same theory
of public employment appeared in Adler, of course, where Justice
Minton waved away the whole first amendment controversy with the
25. Id. at 5.11.
26. Id. at 492.
27. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 318.
28. 325 U.S. 561 (1945).
29. Id. at 576.
30. 339 U.S. at 405.
31. 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
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observation that working for the school system of New York is a
privilege.
32
B. Indirect Attacks on Loyalty Oaths
Over the same 100-year period, but largely in the later 1950's and
early 1960's, the Court developed a variety of devices for disposing of
individual oath provisions while stopping short of the ultimate question
whether all loyalty laws were unconstitutional.
1. Ex Post Facto Clause
In Cummings and Garland the Court relied on an ex post facto argu-
ment to supplement the bill of attainder analysis. Although the chal-
lenged oaths themselves were not criminal laws within the rule of
Calder v. Bull,3 3 they imposed punishment for acts not criminal when
committed.34 The Douds Court reaffirmed the vitality of the early cases
by stressing that Section 9(h) left union officers "free to serve . . .
if at any time they renounce the allegiances which constituted a
bar to signing the affidavit in the past. Past conduct... is not a bar
to resumption of the position."35 In Garner the Justices intimated that
they would have found the city ordinance an ex post facto law but for
the fortuity that the California state statute amending the Los Angeles
charter had been passed seven years before the adoption of the ordi-
nance-two years before the retroactive five-year period began to run.30
2. Scienter Requirement
Even while rejecting bill-of-attainder, first-amendment, and ex-post-
facto arguments, the Court in the early 1950's foreshadowed its use of
the knowing-conduct criterion it would later import into the Smith
Act cases.37 In the Garner decision Justice Clark interpreted the Los
Angeles oath to require knowing membership in a proscribed organiza-
tion. His assumption that "scienter is implicit in each clause of the
oath"' 38 lacked a basis in either the law or the state court opinions con-
struing it, and drew heavy fire from the dissenting members of the
Court.39 The dubiety of the premise, though, indicated the Garner
32. 542 U.S. at 492.
38. 8 US. (8 DalI.) 85 (1798).
34. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 327.
35. 339 U.S. at 414.
36. 341 U.S. at 721.
37. Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961); Scales v. United States, 367 US. 203
(1961).
38. 341 U.S. at 724.
39. E.g., id. at 727 (Frankfurter, J.).
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Court's feeling that deprivation of employment for innocent member-
ship would require invalidation of the statute as a denial of due process.
In Adler the Court reiterated its position, albeit peripherally, by noting
that the New York courts had construed the statutory provisions in-
volved to require knowing membership.
40
The Oklahoma loyalty oath was the first to fall expressly for want of
a scienter limit. In Wieman v. Updegraff (1952) 41 an Oklahoma state
taxpayer sued to enjoin salary payments to public teachers and uni-
versity staff members for their failure to take an oath, required of all
state employees, disavowing (1) advocacy of revolution, sedition, or
treason against the government, (2) teaching or justifying such ad-
vocacy, (3) membership in any organization advocating the overthrow
of the government, (4) affiliation (direct or indirect) with the Com-
munist Party or any group on the Attorney General's list, and (5)
membership in a subversive organization within the preceding five
years. Although the appellants' beliefs failed to raise a scienter objection,
the Court concentrated on it in its opinion. Search though it might, the
Court was unable to find scienter implicit in the act; consequently the
"indiscriminate classification of innocent with knowing activity must
fall as an assertion of arbitrary power."42 Justice Clark, again writing for
the majority, did not explain why the Oklahoma statute could not be
said to contain a scienter element by the same judicial fiat that had
characterized his Garner opinion the year before, and perhaps the
Wieman decision is best understood as a display of growing judicial
impatience with state security legislation.
3. Due Proces Right to Hearing
Throughout the 1950's the Court consistently required a hearing
where the public employee would have a right to explain why he had
refused to take the oath, largely, it seemed, as a backstop to ensure
compliance with the concurrently emerging scienter element. The
Garner ordinance survived in part because the city had dismissed the
petitioners only after an administrative proceeding on their refusal
to sign the oath or execute the affidavit.43 The Adler Court relied on the
assurance of the state court below that the statutory presumption of
non-employability arising from membership in an organization classi-
40. 342 U.S. at 494.
41. 344 US. 183 (1952).
42. 344 U.S. at 191.
43. 341 U.S. at 719.
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fled as subversive was not conclusive, but operated only as an allocation
of the production burden in a hearing where the employee had full
opportunity to rebut it.44
The hearing requirement was determinative in Slochower v. Board
of Higher Education (1956),45 a case concerning security investigations
rather than oaths. There a New York City ordinance required discharge
from public employment whenever an employee invoked the privilege
against self-incrimination to avoid answering questions relating to his
official conduct. A divided Court reversed the summary dismissal of
a professor who had taken the fifth amendment before a United
States Senate committee; the state would have to determine whether
Slochower's continued employment would conflict with any real public
interest. Without a hearing the dismissal violated due process.
The first case involving the Washington state loyalty oaths reaffirmed
the Court's position on hearings. Washington law required an oath
of all public employees that they were not subversive persons, nor
members of either the Communist Party or any subversive organization
advocating, abetting, advising, or teaching overthrow, destruction, or
alteration of the constitutional form of the federal or state governments,
by revolution, force or violence. In Nostrand v. Little (1960)40 the Court
remanded a declaratory judgment suit for a state court determination
whether a "hearing is afforded at which the employee can explain or
defend his refusal to take the oath." Without such a hearing, the ma-
jority implied and the dissenting opinion asserted, the oaths would be
unconstitutional.
By insisting on a right to hearing, the Court neatly destroyed an
element central to all loyalty-oath schemes. Without the hearing re-
quirement, the oath statutes were self-executing: a person refusing to
take the oath simply did not qualify for a position; one swearing falsely
could be prosecuted later for perjury. The due process hearing rule
forced the state to assume the administrative burdens of operating a
security program rather than relying on the automatic effect of a
refusal to swear allegiance.
4. Burden of Proof
In Speiser v. Randall (1958)47 the Court added another weapon to its
due process armory against loyalty oaths. California had denied ap-
44. 842 US. at 495.
45. 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
46. 362 US. 474, 475 (1960).
47. 357 US. 513 (1958).
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pellants a property-tax exemption granted veterans, because they re-
fused to avow that they advocated neither overthrow of the government
nor support of a foreign government against the United States in the
event of hostilities. The statute placed the burden of proving non-
advocacy on the taxpayer, under a general provision requiring taxpayers
to show entitlement to a deduction or benefit. Taking the oath satisfied
the burden. If the taxpayer refused to take the oath, he could attempt to
prove his innocence at a hearing, where he assumed the burden of
proof.
The Supreme Court held the procedure unconstitutional. While the
state could, of course, allocate burdens of proof generally, it could not,
said Mr. Justice Brennan, shift the burden in a manner offensive to
fundamental concepts of justice. The Constitution forbade the state to
"declare an individual guilty or presumptively guilty of a crime" in a
situation where first amendment interests were at stake.48 Throwing the
burden of persuasion on the taxpayer would have a chilling effect on
free speech: "The man who knows that he must bring forth proof and
persuade another of the lawfulness of his conduct necessarily must steer
far wider of the unlawful zone than if the State must bear these
burdens."4 9
5. The Void-for-Vagueness and Overbreadth Doctrine
The next step in the extension of due process to loyalty oaths came
with the application of the vagueness doctrine. In Douds the Court had
rejected a vagueness objection to Section 9(h) because the statute's re-
quirement of willful false swearing effectively restricted punishment to
acts done with knowledge of their illegality.6° Chief Justice Vinson did
not explain how a specific intent to do what the act forbade could
clarify the meaning of a statute that might otherwise be unconstitution-
ally vague.
In Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction (1961),51 the Court invali-
dated a state loyalty oath for the first time on the ground that an affiant
could not know what he was swearing to. Besides the usual disclaimer
that the swearer did not believe in the violent overthrow of the govern-
ment, the Florida statute required an avowal that the affiant "has
never lent his 'aid, support, advice, counsel or influence to the Com-
48. Id. at 524.
49. Id. at 526.
50. 39 U.S. at 418.
51. 368 U.S. 278 (1961).
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munist Party.' "52 Appellant argued that the language was so uncertain
that it put him in fear of prosecution for false swearing if he did sign,
but his affidavit denying Communist Party membership and asserting
his loyalty made the threat of injury so remote as to virtually eliminate
his standing to sue. In the Supreme Court, the majority found an argu-
ment from vagueness all that appellant had left, but that this issue was
more than sufficient to confer capacity to sue. Despite the Florida
courts' gloss importing a scienter limit, the Court held the act uncon-
stitutional. What did it mean to swear that one had never knowingly
lent his "aid," "support," "advice, .... counsel," or "influence" to
the Communist Party? What if he had voted for a Communist Party
candidate, or defended the constitutional rights of a communist?
"Indeed," Mr. Justice Stewart asked, "could anyone honestly subscribe
to this oath who had ever supported any cause with contemporaneous
knowledge that the Communist Party also supported it?"53 The Court
held that the oath was lacking in terms susceptible to objective measure-
ment, and that it was so ambiguous as to encompass "guiltless knowing
behavior."r
Still, the fact that the Florida act, absent any restrictive judicial con-
struction on its face, reached conduct which the state could not con-
stitutionally punish, showed the real objection to the statute to be not
its vagueness, but its overly broad sweep into clearly protected
activities. The vagueness argument served as the vehicle for the first
amendment issue in the case, which Stewart added almost as after-
thought: "The vice of unconstitutional vagueness is further aggravated
where, as here, the statute in question operates to inhibit the exercise
of individual freedoms affirmatively protected by the Constitution."45
Three years after Cramp, in Baggett v. Bullitt (1964),5O both the over-
breadth and free speech arguments underlying the vagueness approach
emerged more dearly. In Baggett the Court finally considered the
Washington state oath system it had refused to pass on in the Nostrand
case. A 1931 oath required all teachers employed by the state to swear
to "promote respect for the flag and the institutions of the United
States.. . and ... reverence for law and order and undivided allegiance
to the government"; a 1955 oath required all state employees to swear
that they were not members of the Communist Party or any subversive
52. Id. at 279.
53. Id. at 286.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 287.
56. 377 US. 360 (1964).
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organization, and that they did not advise, teach or abet those who
would overthrow the government by force.r 7 Both branches fell before
a vagueness-broadness attack. The 1955 oath was not susceptible of
objective measurement, and could subject guiltless knowing behavior
to criminal penalties for false swearing; the 1931 oath was invalidated
because it inhibited professors from criticizing social institutions, and
alternatively because it, like the 1955 oath, was offensive to due process
for its vagueness. The honest and law-abiding oath-taker might steer
far wider of the unlawful zone than if the boundaries of the proscribed
area were clearly demarcated. The vice of the statutory scheme was its
inhibiting effect on the criticism, expression, and association of "[t]hose
with a conscientious regard for what they solemnly swear."58
For the cases Where the statutory language was really too clear for the
Justices to resort to the argument that they were unable to fathom the
meaning of the legislature, the vagueness doctrine generated a con-
comitant "overbreadth" test. The notion that a statute could sweep
with unconstitutional breadth across the range of protected activity
underlay the parade of horribles in Cramp and emerged as an alternate
ground in Baggett.59 As far back as the Garner case, the Court had
hinted at the overbreadth argument by importing a scienter limit to the
statute. In Wieman the statutory complex had given the Court an ample
opportunity to sharpen its vagueness hatchet, but it had opted instead
for the overbreadth reasoning. As with Douds, the dividing line sepa-
rating the activities the state could deter from those it could not lay
along a scienter line: an "[i]ndiscriminate classification of innocent with
knowing activity must fall as an assertion of arbitrary power," said
Justice Clark for the majority, and the statute did not permit the Court
to insert the necessary distinction itself.00
6. Balancing and "Academic Freedom"
Justices Black and Douglas, dissenting in the Adler case, were the
first to suggest that academic freedom might deserve additional con-
sideration because of its importance to first amendment liberties. In
Sweezy v. New Hampshire (1957) 011-a security investigation case-Mr.
Justice Frankfurter delivered a major statement on the importance of
educational liberty to social betterment. Sweezy had been cited for
57. Id. at 362.
58. Id. at 372.
59. 877 U.S. at 372.
60. 344 US. at 191.
61. 854 U.S. 284 (1957).
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contempt after he had refused, on first amendment grounds, to answer
questions put to him by the New Hampshire attorney general about a
lecture he had given at the state university. The majority looked long-
ingly at the ultimate considerations of political and academic freedom
in the case, but rested its reversal of the decision below on the narrow
ground that the legislature, in authorizing the attorney general to con-
duct his investigations, had not indicated with sufficient clarity what
sort of information it wanted him to turn up.02 In a concurring opinion
Frankfurter argued that the Court's task was to reach "a conclusion
based on a judicial judgment in balancing two contending principles--
the right of a citizen to political privacy, as protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the right of the State to self-protection."03 A free
society, Frankfurter continued, depended on free universities, and he
quoted lengthily from various sources to demonstrate the historical
roots of his contention. 4 After assigning academic freedom such a
heavy weight on the scales, Frankfurter found the "shadowy threat to
security" posed by the petitioner too "meagre a countervailing interest"
to warrant encroachment on his personal rights.03
Subsequent opinions, however, indicated that the balancing ap.
proach to loyalty programs might be a sometime thing. In Shelton v.
Tucker (1960)6 Frankfurter again put the competing interests of se-
curity and academic freedom on the scales, but this time the "personal
rights" emphasized in Sweezy lost a good deal of weight. Shelton con-
cerned an Arkansas statute requiring every teacher in a state-supported
school to file an annual affidavit listing all organizations he had be-
longed to or regularly contributed to within the past five years. The
Court did not deny that the state had a legitimate interest in the activ-
ities of its teachers, but thought that "to compel a teacher to disclose his
every associational tie is to impair that teacher's right of free assoda-
tion, a right closely allied to freedom of speech and a right which, like
free speech, lies at the foundation of a free society." The majority
pointed out what Frankfurter had argued in Sweezy: "The viligant
protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vitad tan in
the community of American schools." 0 7 Frankfurter dissented, arguing
that organizational connections, unlike "wholly individual interests,"
62. Id. at 254.
63. Id. at 266-67.
64. Id. at 262-63.
65. Id. at 265.
66. 364 US. 479 (1960).
67. Id. at 485-87.
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gave rise to any number of conceivable reasons for public investigation.
For example, the state might want to know whether the teacher had
overburdened himself with outside obligations.08
Frankfurter's opinions in Sweezy and Shelton exemplified the pitfalls
in the ad hoc balancing theory of the first amendment and raised
serious questions about the value of "academic freedom" as a technique
for handling the loyalty-oath problem. Academic freedom, when it
counted for anything at all in the Court's opinions, came in as an ad-
ditional weight on the first amendment side of the scales. But a factor
which could appear and disappear with such erratic ease was plainly
unable to deal fully with the loyalty-oath question.
II.
The latest Supreme Court opinions display more an agglomeration
of the doctrinal devices accumulating over the years than a reasoned
selection from among them. Elfbrandt v. Russell (1966)9 presented a
challenge to the Arizona oath system, which required affiants to swear
support to the state and federal constitutions, to defend the government
from its enemies, to bear true faith and allegiance, and to discharge the
duties of their offices. The statute punished false swearing by both dis-
charge from employment and criminal prosecution; but a legislative
gloss limited the false-swearing provision to cases where an officer at the
time of taking the oath or thereafter knowingly or willfully overthrew
or aided in the overthrow of the government, or advocated overthrow
by force or violence, or knowingly became a member of the Com-
munist Party or one of its subordinate organizations with knowledge
of its unlawful purpose.70 Arizona had obviously designed the oath,
which was adopted only after the Supreme Court decision in Baggett,
to meet the objections the Court had voiced in its various decisions:
the new law was not ex post facto; it did not punish innocent knowing
membership; it was not particularly vague.
The Justices were unimpressed. Douglas, speaking for the majority,
drew on all the available arguments. The limitation to "mere knowing
membership" might be an improvement on past legislative efforts, but
it still was not good enough: "A law which applies to membership
without the 'specific intent' to further the illegal aims of the' organiza-
68. Id. at 494-95.
69. 384 U.S. 11 (1966).
70. Id. at 12-13.
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tion infringes unnecessarily on protected freedoms." 7' Because the
statute could apply to one who joined an organization conducting il-
legal activities which the member neither engaged in nor intended to
engage in, the law "impose[d], in effect, a conclusive presumption that
the member shares the unlawful aims of the organization. 7"2 The
scheme posed an undue threat to first amendment freedoms; it swept
overbroadly across cherished liberties; it proceeded on the constitu-
tionally impermissible doctrine of "guilt by association."73 Finally, the
law lacked any procedure for an administrative hearing prior to dis-
missal.
Elfbrandt, more than any decision before it, reflected the essentially
homologous nature of all the doctrinal devices circulating through the
opinions. Consider, for example, the rule against "guilt by association"
as announced by Justice Douglas. The proscription applied because the
oath with its accompanying gloss could punish knowing but guiltless
behavior. But while "guilt by association" included as one facet the
problem of punishment for innocent conduct, the doctrine could arise
as well from vagueness-overbreadth considerations. Alternatively, the
Court could have relied on the bill-of-attainder argument in Brown to
reach the same result by changing the language but not the substance of
the analysis. "Guilt by association" was also found in the fact that the
statute was not limited to those with the requisite specific intent, from
which, said the Elfbrandt Court, "[t]he unconstitutionality of [the] Act
follows a fortiori from Speiser v. Randall."7 4 Speiser gave "guilt by as-
sociation" a basis in the due process objection to a presumption of guilt
that the employee had the burden of rebutting. And finally, the guilt-
by-association doctrine arose from the first amendment guaranty pro-
tecting the right of association and permitting the punishment only of
conduct.75 Elfbrandt, in short, left little of guilt by association as an
independent objection to loyalty oaths; it tended to collapse the doc-
trine to a merely rhetorical formulation of each of the underlying
objections the Court had previously advanced.
In Keyishian v. Board of Regents (1967),70 the Justices passed again
on the New York Feinberg program they had upheld in the Adler de-
cision. During the fifteen intervening years the state had implemented
71. Id. at 19.
72. Id. at 17.
73. Id. at 19.
74. Id. at 17.
75. Id. at 18.
76. 585 U.S. 589 (1967).
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an impressively complex statutory scheme. 7 Section 105 of the Civil
Service Law prohibited the appointment to office of anyone (a) who
wilfully and deliberately advocated, advised, or taught the overthrow
of the government by force, violence, or unlawful means; or (b) who
printed or published any writing advocating, advising, or teaching such
and who advocated, advised, taught, or embraced the duty, necessity,
or propriety of adopting the doctrine contained therein; or (c) who or-
ganized or helped organize or became a member of a group teaching
or advocating forcible overthrow. The Section also made membership
in the Communist Party prima facie evidence of disqualification; but
disqualification entitled the aggrieved party to petition for a hearing.
The utterance of any treasonable or seditious word or the commission
of any treasonable or seditious act while holding a state position, con.
stituted ground for removal from office. A treasonable word or deed
was defined as "treason" within the New York Penal Law; a seditious
word or deed, as "criminal anarchy."
Additional provisions in the Education Law applied exclusively to
public school employees. Section 3021 reiterated the Section 105 re-
movability for utterance or commission of seditious or treasonable
word or act, without, however, incorporating the Penal Law definitions.
Section 3022 required the State Board of Regents to establish a program
for disqualifying personnel under Sections 105 and 3021, and to list all
Section 105 organizations (drawing on federal agencies for whatever
help it might need), with the prima-facie-evidence consequences for
members prescribed in Section 105. The Regents promulgated appro-
priate regulations under the statute, among them the requirement, first,
that teachers sign a certificate denying present Communist Party
membership and affirming notice to the State University President in
the event of past membership; and second, that non-teaching school
personnel file a written answer to the question whether they had ever
advised or taught, or been a member of a group teaching or advocating
forcible overthrow of the government.
One group of appellants, professors at a state university, refused to
sign the certificates; each was notified that failure to sign would result
in dismissal. Another appellant, a non-faculty employee, refused to file
the written answer required; he was fired. They all brought suit for
declaratory and injunctive relief. Just before trial the Regents rescinded
the certificate requirement and announced that refusal to sign would
77. The relevant statutory provision and the Regents' regulations are printed as an
appendix to the opinion, 385 U.S. at 610-20.
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no longer automatically constitute grounds for dismissal. In place of
the certificate the Regents instituted a personal interview for cases
where the applicant was uncertain whether he was qualified under the
statutes, and in which refusal to answer relevant questions of the hiring
officer would be sufficient ground to refuse an appointment. "A pro-
spective appointee who does not believe himself disqualified need take
no affirmative action," said the brochure. "No disclaimer oath is
required."78
The abandonment of the Feinberg Certificate might have been
thought to render the whole case academic, so to speak. The Court dis-
agreed. "The change in procedure in no wise moots appellants' con-
stitutional questions raised in the context of their refusal to sign,"
wrote Mr. Justice Brennan for the majority. "The substance of the
statutory and regulatory complex remains and from the outset appel-
lants' basic daim has been that they are aggrieved by its application."7
That may have been the claim, but the fact was that removal of the
certificate eliminated any threat of application of the oath system. The
change in procedure meant that New York had substituted a security
investigation program for its oath statute so far as public teachers were
concerned, a fact that left appellants with little more than an attack on
the constitutionality of the new state security scheme on its face. That
made the Adler precedent irrelevant, since that case had merely sus-
tained a different oath system now abandoned by the Regents. The
Court however, chose to view Adler as pertinent but distinguishable.
Since some parts of the statute were not in existence when Adler was
decided, and since some challenges had not been properly raised, a
portion at least of the complaint was salvageable: Adler could not fore-
close the appellants' contention that Sections 3021 and 105 were void
for vagueness.80 The procedural hurdles thus tipped over, the Court
proceeded to pass on the merits, applying the standard arguments form-
erly reserved for loyalty oaths to the New York investigation program,
and apparently oblivious to the fact that rescission of the oath had
shifted the burden of the whole statutory scheme from the employee to
the state.
Justice Brennan first considered the sedition-treason provisions, and
found them undefinable. To be sure, Sections 105 and 3021 tracked one
another, and the former incorporated the Penal Law definitions for
78. Id. at 596.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 595.
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"treason" and "criminal anarchy." But the Court could find no similar
incorporation for Section 3021, and even if it could have, one look at
the Penal Law convinced it that the Section 105 incorporation had only
made matters worse. The majority could discern "virtually no limit" to
the possible scope of the term "seditious."' Would carrying the Com-
munist Manifesto on the street be seditious? Did the statute prohibit
abstract "advocacy" of seditious doctrine? Did the teacher "who informs
his class about the precepts of Marxism or the Declaration of Indepen-
dence violate this prohibition?"8' 2 For the majority the questions were
unanswerable under the law as written. As a result of the vagueness,
"no teacher can know just where the line is drawn between 'seditious'
and nonseditious utterance and acts."8 3
As for the advocacy and distribution provisions of Section 105, they
fell for much the same reason: their vagueness and overbreadth made
them "highly efficient in terrorem mechanism[s]" for the deterrence of
"that free play of the spirit which all teachers ought especially to culti-
vate and practice ... ."84 Finally, taken as a whole, the statutory scheme
suffered from an overriding vagueness difficulty: it was impossible to
understand. New York had created a "regulatory maze," whose am-
biguity of wording was "aggravated by prolixity and profusion of stat-
utes, regulations, and administrative machinery, and by manifold cross-
references to interrelated enactments and rules."8
While Section 3021 fell because of its vagueness and overbreadth,
Sections 3022 and 105 were unconstitutional because they were too
specific, at least insofar as they prohibited members of the Communist
Party from qualifying for state employment. In invalidating these pro-
visions, the majority relied primarily on Elfbrandt, holding that any
sanctions based on a mere showing of knowing membership, without a
further demonstration of specific intent to carry out the illegal aims of
the organization, would rest on a doctrine of guilt by association re-
pugnant to the Constitution.0 The "specific intent" requirement effec-
tively meant that the state must prove each teacher refusing to take the
oath guilty of unlawful conduct other than the refusal. Speiser v.
Randall would of course apply to prevent the state from creating a pre-
81. Id. at 599.
82. Id. at 600.
83. Id. at 599.
84. Id. at 601.
85. Id. at 604.
86. Id. at 606.
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sumption of such conduct at the hearing, and so placing on the em-
ployee the burden of proving his innocence.8 7
The New York law thus fell because the Keyishian Court insisted on
treating the security investigation program like a loyalty oath. The
program had operated as such, when petitioners initiated suit, but
dropping the certificate had eliminated the self-executing character-
istics central to the concept of a loyalty-oath system. In one breath the
Court reiterated that the state had a legitimate interest in protecting its
educational system from subversion-the familiar incantation before
the sacrifice-and in the next invalidated just such a non-oath program,
the application of which was not before the Justices.
While the Keyishian Court relied on a vague loyalty oath no longer
in existence to invalidate the New York security investigation program,
a six-man majority in the next case, from Maryland, reasoned from a
security investigation program not even at issue in the litigation to in-
validate the loyalty oath before it. In Whitehill v. ,lhinsss decided last
November, Maryland required all state employees to swear that they
were "not engaged in one way or another in the attempt to overthrow
the Government of the United States.... ,8 1 The petitioner, applying
for a teaching position at the state university, sued for a declaratory
judgment that the oath was unconstitutional. The Court, speaking
through Justice Douglas, held that the pledge must be read in conjunc-
tion with the Ober Act,90 under which the state Board of Regents and
the attorney general had promulgated the oath. The oath itself was not
a part of the Act, nor did it look to the Act as a referent in defining its
own terms. The Court did not suggest that the oath standing by itself
was void for vagueness. But the Ober Act was vague, and so the oath
fell. The act was vague because it was broad; it was broad because it
lacked a scienter limit; and the absence of scienter was fatal for the
consequent chilling effect upon "conscientious teachers." Sections 1
and 18 of the Act reached those who would "alter" the form of govern-
ment "by revolution, force, or violence," and those who were members
of a subversive organization or a foreign subversive organization. The
Court found itself "beset with difficulties":
Would a member of a group that was out to overthrow the Gov-
87. See pp. 74748 supra.
88. 889 U.S. 54 (1967).
89. Id. at 55.
90. ID. ANN. CODE Art. 85A (1957).
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eminent by force or violence be engaged in that attempt "in one
way or another" within the meaning of the oath, even though he
was ignorant of the real aims of the group and wholly innocent of
any illicit purpose? We do not know; nor could a prospective em-
ployee know, save as he risked a prosecution for perjury.01
It is difficult to resist the conclusion that the Court's "difficulties" were
self-manufactured, especially since the Maryland courts had construed
the same provisions of the Ober Act to require proof that an individual
applicant "advocate" overthrow by force and violence before the state
could disqualify him from employment.02 That, however, was not
enough. According to Justice Douglas, the alteration and membership
clauses were still "befogged." The Act lacked the "[p]recision and
clarity" essential to avoid deterring "the flowering of academic
freedom .... -93
The triviality of the Whitehill argument is reflected in its result: the
Maryland legislature could resurrect the oath simply by re-enacting it,
word for word, or by reauthorizing its promulgation. Indeed, given the
severability clause in the Ober Act-which the Court did not suggest is
unconstitutional-and the consequent validity of the authorizing and
delegating provisions, the attorney general may reinstitute the exact
oath that the Court has overthrown for vagueness9 4
The latest case in the series came down January 22, 1968. Knight v.
Board of Regents5 involved an aspect of the New York Education Law
not passed on in Keyishian. In pertinent part Section 3002 of the Edu-
cation Law provided:
It shall be unlawful for any citizen of the United States to serve
as teacher, instructor or professor in any school or institution in
the public school system of the state or in any school, college,
university or other educational institution in this state, whose
real property.., is exempt from taxation... unless and until he
or she shall have taken and subscribed the following oath or affir-
mation: "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support the
constitution of the United States of America and the constitution
of the State of New York, and that I will faithfully discharge, ac-
cording to the best of my ability, the duties of the position of
j,... to which I am now assigned.20
91. 389 U.S. at 59.
92. Shub v. Simpson, 196 Md. 177, 76 A.2d 332 (1950).
93. 389 U.S. at 62.
94. MD. ANN. CODE Art. 85A § 18 (1957).
95. 36 U.S.L.W. 3296 (U.S. Jan. 22, 1967), af'g mem. 269 F. Supp. 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
96. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3002 (McKinney 1953).
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Twenty-seven faculty members at Adelphi University (a private, non-
profit, tax-exempt school) refused to execute the oath, and brought
suit to enjoin its enforcement in the federal district court. In June,
1967, a three-judge panel unanimously upheld the validity of the
statute.97 On direct appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, without opin-
ion, thus ratifying if not adopting what the lower court had said. An
appraisal of the significance of the Supreme Court's decision accordingly
requires an examination of the opinion below.
The results of that examination are not encouraging. To begin with,
the case arose on perhaps the most ambiguous record to grace the Su-
preme Court's files since the celebrated Adler litigation of 16 years
before. The ambiguity was attributable to legal mismanagement rather
than statutory desuetude; Adelphi officials had inadvertently over-
looked the Section 3002 requirement ever since it was first enacted in
1934, and the Board of Regents seems to have been equally remiss. Ap-
parently nobody was sure even how to enforce the law: the court was
unable to say whether a refusal to sign the oath would lead to prosecu-
tion of the teachers, prosecution of the school, suspension of the latter's
tax exemption, or some combination of the three.08
Judge Tyler, writing for the court, placed primary reliance on what
he termed the "affirmative" character of the oath. Its first branch merely
paralleled the customary pledge of allegiance intoned by state legis-
lators on taking office; the second amounted only to a request by the
state that private-school teachers subscribe to professional competence
and dedication in consideration for their institution's tax-exempt
status.
The argument had a surface appeal, but not much more than that.
As for the section of the oath requiring a pledge of allegiance, the court
offered only the dictum from Bond v. Floyd 9 that an oath requirement
for state legislators does not infringe upon their first amendment rights.
Private-school teachers are not state legislators, however, and a court so
inclined might have examined the unquestioned differences between
them.
The plaintiffs' first argument was that exacting an affirmative expres-
sion of loyalty from a teacher violated the rule in West Virginia State
97. Knight v. Board of Regents 269 F. Supp. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
98. The first part of Section 3002 makes it unlawful for a dtizen to teach in an insti-
tution that has a tax exemption unless and until he has taken the oath. The second
prohibits an officer of such an institution from hiring someone who will not take the oath.
99. 385 US. 116, 132 (1966).
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Board of Education v. Barnette;100 but that case, said the court, was
clearly distinguishable, first, because the pledge there was "far more
elaborate" than the affirmation required by New York, and second,
because the decision in Barnette rested solely on the first amendment
guaranty of religious freedom. The court did not explain the relevance
of "elaborateness" as a test of virtue for loyalty oaths, nor did it suggest
why Justice Jackson's language placing the Barnette decision on a
broader base than religious freedom should be ignored.101
Plaintiffs next contended that the affirmative-oath aspect of the
statutory requirement was unconstitutionally vague. The court dis-
agreed. Baggett, Keyishian, Elfbrandt, and Cramp were all different
cases, said Judge Tyler, because there the oaths were "negative" and
"such oaths... typically require an affiant to state that he is not now
and has never been a member of certain organizations .. ."102 The
court's definition of negative loyalty oaths suggested that the judges
thought them invalid as ex post facto laws, while the affirmative oath
now before them looked only to the future. But the oaths in Baggett
and Elfbrandt were not ex post facto, and did not go to past member-
ship or conduct.10 3 Judge Tyler also seemingly suggested that requiring
a mere expression of loyalty to the Government made a constitutional
difference. Other courts had not thought the distinction between posi-
tive and negative oaths so persuasive. The Supreme Court, for example,
invalidated the 1931 Washington state oath in Baggett v. Bullitto4 that
100. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
101. 269 F. Supp. at 340-41. The plaintiffs in Barnette, were, according to Judge Tyler,
"members of a religious group who claimed that the requirement of the oath and ac-
companying salute violated their religious beliefs." Id. at 341. That reading of the Barnette
case fails to deal with statements in the opinion thought to be hallmarks in the Supreme
Court's articulation of a general first amendment right not to speak:
The question which underlies the flag salute controversy [wrote Justice Jackson for
the majority] is whether such a ceremony so touching matters of opinion and polit-
ical attitude may be imposed upon the individual by official authority under powers
committed to any political organization under our Constitution.
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high
or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or
other matters or opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein,
If there are any circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now occur
to us.
319 U.S. at 635, 642. Evidently the three-judge court had thought of one. Its suggestion
that the principles of the Barnette case are now invocable only by those with a religious
objection to compelled utterance is a disturbing one, and the Supreme Court's affirmance,
however summary, does nothing to ease the sense of discomfort generated by Judge Tyler's
opinion.
102. 269 F. Supp. at 341.
103. Cramp did look to past actions, requiring the teacher to swear "I have not and
will not lend ,my aid .6. " 368 U.S. at 279 (emphasis added). In Keyishian the statutes
did not refer to past conduct, 385 U.S. at 610-20, but the Regents' regulations provided
that past conduct could be investigated and was relevant to qualification.
104. 377 U.S. 860 (1964).
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required teachers to swear "to promote respect for the flag and institu-
tions of the United States... and... reverence for law and order and
undivided allegiance to the government"; the Washington language
may not have been identical to a pledge of allegiance, and it may have
amounted to a promise to do good as well as to be loyal, but the Su-
preme Court had still thrown it out on the ground that it effectively
inhibited professors from criticizing social institutions.
As a last argument, plaintiffs urged the three-judge court to recog-
nize the preferred status accorded teachers by the Supreme Court in
the loyalty-oath cases. The Knight court declined. "We interpret the
statute," it said, "to impose no restrictions upon political or philo-
sophical expressions by teachers.... ."105 Again there was no attempt
to reconcile that decision with the holding in Baggett.
The three-judge court concluded:
A state does not interfere with its teachers by requiring them to
support the governmental systems which shelter and nourish the
institutions in which they teach, nor does it restrict its teachers by
encouraging them to uphold the highest standards of their chosen
profession. Indeed, it is plain that a state has a clear interest in
assuring "***careful and discriminating selection of teachers" by
its publicly supported educational institutions.100
It is difficult to know what to make of that argument. The notion that
the oath system simply attached a permissible condition to the oppor-
tunity to teach virtually restated the now discarded "privilege" doc-
trine. The suggestion that the New York statute merely "encouraged"
teachers to uphold their professional standards treated rather cavalierly
the criminal penalties apparently following upon a disinclination at the
employer level to be "encouraged"; and the idea that the state can
"carefully discriminate" among the teachers that a private school may
hire, on the basis of their willingness to swear their loyalty to the state
and federal governments, should have attracted a few raised eyebrows
in the Supreme Court.
Judge Tyler's Knight opinion is all the more puzzling for the things
it does not say. Specifically, what has happened to Speiser v. Randall?'07
It is not dear in Knight that Section 3002 entitles either the school or
the teachers to a due-process hearing at all. Nothing in the record sug-
gests who has the burden of proof at the hearing, assuming there is
105. 269 F. Supp. at 341.
106. Id. at 341-42.
107. 357 US. 513 (1958).
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one. It is no answer to say that the state will have the burden of proving
the offense at a criminal prosecution of the school for continuing non-
affiants in its employ: first, the state may conceivably deny the tax ex-
emption instead, and even if it does proceed by criminal charges, it
proves its case by showing the mere fact that teachers have not signed.
The Supreme Court's summary affirmance is a mystifying disposition
of the case. It would be consoling to think that a decision without
opinion is like a denial of certiorari or dismissal of an appeal-signi-
fying nothing, and without precedential significance. But a summary
affirmance is an affirmance still, and an appraisal of the decision's im-
pact on the prior case law is no less necessary because the Justices
thought it superfluous or unwise to explain their action. Even before
Knight the Elfbrandt-Keyishian-Whitehill trilogy had demonstrated
the risks inherent in attempting a summation; the latest decision de-
prives us even of the comforts in Mr. Justice Harlan's caustic Whitehill
observation that "The only thing that does shine through the opinion
of the majority is that its members do not like loyalty oaths."108
III.
Elfbrandt, Keyishian, and Whitehill bring no new analysis to bear on
the loyalty-oath question. At best the three cases merely weave the
principles of the earlier decisions. Such a procedure is not always il.
luminating, and it is not unfair to say that the three decisions are more
noteworthy for their welter of quotations than for the clarity of their
reasoning. The principles articulated-and they are many-either
subtly evade the ultimate issues involved, or deal narrowly with the
precise question presented, or are so general and sweeping that they are
best characterized as emotive rather than cognitive.
Indeed, all the arguments the Court has offered begin to look more
like one another the more closely they are examined. The decisions in
Cummings, Lovett, and Brown, for instance, leave the reader with the
impression that the laws there invalidated really fell as bills of attainder
because they offended the due-process notion later crystallized as the
overbreadth doctrine. Cramp and Baggett speak of the due process ob-
jections to undue ambiguity and sweep, but they focus on the first
amendment values of thought and association. Wieman looks to the
unfairness of classifying the knowing with the innocent in a way that
108. 389 U.S. at 63.
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reflects, if it does not duplicate, the reasoning of the bill of attainder
cases. Elfbrandt offers "guilt by association" as a theme amenable to
explanation under any one of the above rationales. Keyishian relies on
all the arguments to strike down a loyalty-oath program that turns out
to be no loyalty oath program at all. Whitehill stands as a vagueness
decision looking aimlessly about for a place to happen.
Knight, on the other hand, is perhaps best viewed as a trial bal-
loon, sensing out reaction to a distinction along "affirmative-negative"
lines. It may of course be something else: it may be a dispositive conclu-
sion of the issue; it may be an embarrassed acknowledgment that the
Court cannot gird itself to invalidate an oath whose words the Constitu-
tion itself requires the President to recite at his inauguration, in which
case it is as definitive a statement of the law as we are likely to get; it
could even be a mistake. But seen as a tentative proposal for dif-
ferentiating good from bad oaths systems, it offers a solution that should
be speedily retired.
A narrow decision, restricted to the perhaps innocuous wording of
Section 3002, might have allowed the Court to avoid the appearance of
pushing logic to its wooden extreme. And such a decision may have
been all the Court intended. But its summary affirmance, with the
suggestion that an "affirmative-negative" distinction may be viable,
ominously resembles a thirteenth chime of the grandfather clock: not
only is it inappropriate but it also calls into question the validity of the
preceding twelve. The "affirmative" oath as a generic category is
no less insulting and dangerous than its "negative" counterpart. Both
presuppose that one not signing the oath does not support the govern-
ment, and therefore does not merit a governmental benefit. Both desig-
nate a class of citizens as guilty of disloyal conduct until each member
of the class establishes his innocence by swearing to his proper beliefs--
in Knight, "true faith and allegiance." The New York statute involved
in Knight displayed the vices of a classic loyalty-oath program: its en-
forcement procedures were so uncertain that not even the court could
be sure what they were; and on its face it held the institutional em-
ployer guilty of a misdemeanor-assuming such was the applicable
penalty-simply on the school's retention of a teacher who refused to
execute the oath, without opportunity by either employer or employee
to justify the refusal.
Even more seriously, the Knight decision holds out the prospect that
every "negative" loyalty oath-including the ones the Court has inval-
idated-may rise again in a new, constitutionally approved, "affirma-
tive" aspect. A state so inclined could define "allegiance" to the govern-
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ment in just the terms of nonsubversive status and non-Communist
Party membership that fell in the cases up to Knight. No one can be
sure, for instance, that in enforcing the newly revitalized Section 3002,
the New York Board of Regents will not define the elements of either
the "affirmative-oath" or "professionalism" branch in precisely the
terms that the Supreme Court found impermissibly vague in the Key-
ishian litigation. Even if the Court pierces through the "affirmative"
surface of such a statute to reach its "negative" underpinnings, the
Knight decision will have only precipated another round of litigation
just like the one everybody had thought was finished with Whitehill.
The better approach, then, is an abandonment of the Knight sugges-
tions and a return to the relative stability of the three preceding cases.
Even there the Court has left a confusion and duplication of doctrine.
But it has already erected a barrier sufficient, with only moderate forti-
fication, to deny all loyalty-oath programs their self-executing character.
The purpose of any oath program is to create a procedure that operates
automatically to deny the public benefit in question upon a refusal to
swear fealty. If the state must amass its own evidence to show that the
applicant or recipient is unsuitable for, say, public employment, the
state has not an oath system but a security investigation program. Such
a program lacks the ease of administration of an oath system; it also
lacks the most insolent feature of an oath system, the presumption that
anyone who will not swear to his loyalty is in fact not loyal.100
The case law makes clear that an oath system may not constitution-
ally operate automatically: even after refusing to take a required oath,
the job-holder must be offered a hearing. Moreover, Speiser v. Randall
shows that at the hearing the state must bear the burden of showing
the person's disloyalty, or at any rate that he is a security risk of defined
magnitude.110 But Speiser deals inadequately with the question of what
burden the state must bear and how it may meet the burden. While
Speiser shifts both the production burden-the responsibility for ini-
tial presentation of fact-and the persuasion burden-the responsi-
bility for convincing the trier of fact-to the state, it fails to indicate
how substantial the production burden must be. If the opinion is read
109. Justice Field, in Cummings, stated the personal objection to oaths generally after
he had found the one before him to be unconstitutional:
The clauses in question subvert the presumption of innocence, and alter the rules of
evidence . . . . They assume that the parties are guilty; they call upon the parties
to establish their innocence; and they declare that such innocence can be shown only
in one way-by an inquisition, in the form of an expurgatory oath, into the con.
sciences of the parties.
71 U.S. at 328.
110. 357 U.S. at 525-26.
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narrowly to permit the state to satisfy its production burden simply by
submitting the fact of the employee's refusal to take the oath, then the
law may be in the position of the famous French king. It has marched
up the hill with lofty purpose by requiring a hearing before dismissal;
it has walked down by placing the employee back very nearly where he
started-after the state introduces his refusal as evidence, he must in-
troduce evidence of his innocence or risk a finding by the trier of fact
that the state has met its burden of persuasion. The employee will be
under strong pressure, at the very least, to perform the functional
equivalent of an oath-swearing by denying his guilt.
If Speiser is to be at all effective, it must be read to do more. To
prohibit such a circumvention of the due-process rule that the decision
establishes, the case should be taken to impose a stiffer burden of pro-
duction on the state; Speiser should require the state to introduce some
evidence of the misconduct prohibited by the oath, independent of the
mere refusal to sign the oath. Whether a refusal to sign may properly
constitute evidence of misconduct is another question, and one for
which Speiser contains no answer. Even without delineating the infer-
ences that may follow from refusal, however, by stiffening the state's
production burden the Speiser decision will have forced a conversion
of the oath system into a security investigation program where the re-
fusal to take an oath is at most of only evidentiary significance, insuffi-
cient by itself to justify dismissal.
That conversion, of course, is something less than an unalloyed tri-
umph so long as the old security cases remain on the books. Decisions
where the state has been permitted to fire an employee as a "security
risk"' or as "insubordinate" after he had invoked the privilege against
self-incrimination in response to questions about Communist party as-
sociations are hardly monuments to civil libertarianism; and a move-
ment from the present case law on loyalty oaths to the older disingen-
uous thinking exemplified by Beilan, Lerner, and Nelson is a consum-
mation devoutly to be avoided."'
Even in the context of a security investigation program, moreover,
important questions must arise concerning what areas of the employee's
private life the state may inquire into, and what substantive standards
it may apply in deciding to dismiss. As for the former, the same prin-
ciples leading the Court to the conclusion that a mere refusal to swear
111. Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 362 US. 1 (1960); Lerner v. Casey. 357 U.S. 503
(1958); Beilan v. Board of Pub. Educ., 357 U.S. 399 (1958).
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loyalty can not alone justify automatic dismissal should lead to the
conclusion that the state Cannot inquire at will into the private beliefs
of an employee, as opposed to inquiring into clearly defined factual
matters closely related to the conduct of his job.112
As for the standards upon which dismissal may be based, last De-
cember's decision in United States v. Robel"3 does much to undermine
all broad-ranging statutes that deal haphazardly with ill-defined security
menaces. In Robel, which involved a criminal prosecution, the Court
invalidated the McCarran Act provisions prohibiting any member of a
Communist-action organization to engage in employment in a defense
facility; the law's inclusion of passive or inactive members of designated
organizations and of non-sensitive positions in the defense industry ren-
dered it overly broad. "The statute quite literally establishes guilt by
association alone," wrote the Chief Justice, "without any need to estab-
lish that an individual's association poses the threat feared by the Gov-
ernment in proscribing it."' 1
4
In evaluating actual standards for discharge, the Court will face
the difficult questions on the permissible scope of statutory language
that have plagued it in the loyalty-oath cases. In this sense the functional
demise of loyalty-oath systems does not of itself usher in a new day. But
by interring loyalty oaths as a self-executing device, the Court can ac-
cord proper recognition to the principle that due process forbids the
legislature to render a judicial judgment by isolating one group of
people on the basis of their application for or receipt of a state benefit
such as employment, assuming them all guilty of misconduct, and then
punishing them by denying them the benefit if they fail to remove the
taint by swearing to an oath. Such an approach has the additional bene-
fit of corresponding with the real objection to fealty systems: their in-
discriminate and offensive suggestion of disloyalty, arising solely from
an individual's application for a publicly conferred advantage.
112. Cf. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 519-20 (1967) (doncutring opinion of Fortig, J.).
113. 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
114. Id. at 424.
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